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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROY JAMES BARNHILL d/b/a 
Zions Furniture Upholstering 
Plaintiff a:nd Appellant 
vs. 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY, 
a corporation 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 
9591 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Roy James Barnhill dba Zions Furniture Upholster-
ing hereinafter referred to as ((Plaintiff" brought this ac-
tion against Young Electric Sign Company, a corpora-
tion, hereinafter referred to as uDefendant." Plaintiff 
claimed that Defendant was negligent in the maintenance 
and repair of an electric sign which was located on top of 
the building occupied by Plaintiff and as a result, Plain-
tiff's business and goods were destroyed by a fire on Oc-
tober 30, 1959. 
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At the close of the Plaintiff's case the Court granted 
a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that there 
was no reasonable basis on which a jury could find that 
defendant caused the fire or that defendant was negligent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the following statement of facts we will attempt 
to present the material facts most favorable to the plain-
tiff, whether disputed or not, together with the undis-
puted facts which favor the defendant. 
Plaintiff owned and operated a furniture and uphol-
stery business in a building located at 2 0 0 0 South Main, 
Bountiful, Utah. ( R. 21 ) The building occupied by the 
plaintiff is in the uy" at Parkin Junction, across the high-
way from the Slim Olson Service Station in Bountiful, 
Utah. Defendant had installed and maintained an elec-
tric sign on top of the building with a ((Cream O'W eber" 
advertisement on the south side of the sign and a ((Hod 
Sanders Clover Club Potato Chips" advertisement on the 
north side of the sign. (See plaintiff's exhibit P-1) The 
building occupied by Plaintiff was completely gutted by 
a fire which occurred during the early morning of Oc-
to her 3 0, 19 59. ( R. 3 0) 
Lynn Mendenhall, a truck driver for Pacific Inter-
mountain Express, testified that he drove past the build-
ing occupied by the plaintiff about 2:15 or 2:25 A.M. on 
the morning of October 30, 1959. (R. 45) Mendenhall 
stated he did not remember whether the sign was on and 
there was nothing in the building that attracted his atten-
tion. (R. 46) Mendenhall stated there was a severe wind 
on the night of October 30, and that he called his home 
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office to advise it was unsafe for unladen vehicles to travel 
on the highway because three trucks had been blown over 
by the wind. (R. 46) 
Elmer Lee, a journeyman lineman for the Utah Pow-
er and Light Co. was on a trouble call in Val Verda (a 
mile and a half to two miles northeast of Slim Olsen's Serv-
ice Station) at about 3:30 A.M. on October 30th, 1959, 
when he noticed a kind of orange color around Slim Ol-
sen's. (R. 48) When he arrived at the Parkin Junction 
he saw the building engulfed in a raging inferno. (R. 49) 
Lee testified tha.t the sign was definitely off when he went 
to it. (R. 51) He also stated there was a severe wind 
blowing debris and smoke and tinder across the highway 
toward the west. ( R. 49) 
John Meyer, the nightman for Slim Olsen's Service 
Station saw the fire between 3:00 and 4:00 A.M. on the 
morning of October 30th, 1959. (R. 52) Because of the 
terrific wind Meyer had been out watching the signs and 
the roof of the warehouse at the Service Station, when he 
happened to glance over and saw the flames in the building. 
(R. 53) When Meyer first saw the fire it appeared to be 
inside the building. (R. 54) Meyer testified that he did 
not think the sign was on when he noticed the fire. He 
stated the sign turned off around nzidnight or shortly 
thereafter. (R. 54) 
Ralph Gayhart, a bus driver for Greyhound Bus Co. 
drove past the Parkin Junction heading South toward 
Salt Lake at approximately 2:45 A.M. on the morning of 
October 30, 1959. (R. 64) Gayhart stated as he ap-
proached the Junction he saw a udisturbance" on the sign. 
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He also saw a fire on top of the building. (R. 64-65) Gay-
hart testified he could not say whether the fire was under-
neath the sign or not. (R. 65) Gayhart said there was a 
terrific wind on the night of October 29-30th and it was 
all he could do to keep the bus on the road. (R. 68) 
David Knapton, Raymond Fivas and Helen Hunt, 
employees of plaintiff, all testified that they arrived at 
work between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. on the morning of 
October 30, 1959 and that the interior of the building had 
been ·Completely destroyed by the fire. They all testified 
that on October 29, 1959, the day before the fire, de-
fendant's employees had been out working on the sign. 
(R. 90, 104, 113) Knapton and Fivas testified there was 
something hanging down from the sign when they ar-
rived at the building the morning after the fire. (R. 91, 
105) Knapton had no judgment as to when the object 
came down. (R. 96) Fivas testified that defendant's em-
ployees came out the morning after the fire and cut down 
the object hanging from the sign. (R. 106) 
Knapton and Fivas said they used tobacco while on 
the job. (R. 98, 108) Knapton testified there was a gas 
furnace located in the front of the building in the show-
room. (R. 98) He also admitted that they had just 
stocked up on matting, stuffing and cotton used in the 
upholstery business. ( R. 1 0 0) He stated they had quite 
a lot of flammable finishing equipment in the eastern part 
of the building. Helen Hunt admitted there was a stove 
in the building beside the furnace. ( R. 114) She said the 
stove had not been lit for a month but it was fired up in 
September or October. (R. 115) Helen Hunt stated she 
turned the gas furnace down when she left the building 
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on the evening of October 29, 1959. Fivas admitted that 
a windstorm had blown out the windows in the building 
two or three times before. (R. 108) 
James Barnhill, the plaintiff, testified he arrived at the 
building at about 8:00 on the morning of October 30, 
19 59. ( R. 3 2) Barnhill testified that the i tern he saw hang-
ing down from the sign was about eight or nine inches 
across and about six to eight feet long. (R. 130) Barnhill 
did not know when the object came down from the sign. 
(R. 130) 
The Court granted defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict after the plaintiff rested. 
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POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH 
THE JURY COULD FIND THAT THE SIGN 
CAUSED THE FIRE. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in this record to 
show that defendant's sign caused the fire. It is funda-
mental that plaintiff must produce some competent evi-
dence from which the jury could find that the sign caused 
the fire before he is entitled to go to the jury. He failed 
to produce any evidence of causation. The uncontroverted 
evidence shows that the cause of the fire is unknown. 
The building was completely destroyed during a violent 
windstorm in the early morning. The damage occurred 
before anyone could examine the interior of the building. 
Defendant is not required to show the cause of plaintiff's 
damage. That burden belongs solely to the plaintiff. The 
facts adduced by the plaintiff's witnesses do not reach the 
dignity of circumstantial evidence as they produced noth-
ing more than mere possibilities. This court has held that 
a jury may not base a verdict on speculation or conjecture. 
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 5 Utah 2d 373, 
302 P. 2d 471 (Utah 1956); Jackson v. Colston et al 116 
Utah 295, 209 P. 2d 566 (Utah 1949). 
The fact that there was high voltage in the sign 
proves nothing because the uncontroverted evidence 
showed that the sign shut off around midnight. The fire 
was not discovered until approximately three hours after 
the sign went off which would raise the presumption that 
the sign had nothing whatsoever to do with the fire. There 
were many instrumentalities which could have caused the 
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fire, including the gas furnace, the stove, cigarette butts 
left by plaintiff's employees and any number of causes 
that would be attributable to the violent wind. 
The fact that defendant's employees were working 
on the sign the day before the fire proves absolutely noth-
ing. This fact would raise the presumption that the sign 
was left in good .condition. The presence of plaintiff's 
employees in the building the day before the fire with the 
gas furnace on is a fact more probative of the cause than 
the presence of defendant's employees. The fact that the 
fire was seen on the roof of the building and there was a 
disturbance on the sign does not show the cause of the 
fire. There was no evidence that the fire started on the 
sign. The undisputed evidence proved that the sign shut 
off at nzidnight and was off when the fire was discovered. 
(R. 51-54) The fact that the fire was seen on the roof 
is no indication of the cause of the fire, particularly in 
view of the fact that the building had partitions and rooms 
which would have blocked outside vision of a fire inside 
the building. (R. 131) 
The evidence that part of the sign was hanging down 
after the fire is not probative of the cause in the absence 
of evidence as to when the part fell. If the part fell down 
after 1nidnight when the sign was off, it would not have 
carried any electricity and obviously could not have started 
the fire. The weather report (plaintiff's exhibit P. 7) 
shows that the strongest winds occurred during the early 
morning of October 30, 1959, after the sign was shut off. 
It is most likely that part of the sign fell after the electri-
city was off and after the :fire had damaged the sign. 
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Plaintiff's facts do not constitute any evidence on 
which a jury could find that the sign caused the fire. The 
wisdom of the rule that a jury should not be allowed to 
speculate is demonstrated by the facts of this case. It can 
be argued that it is possible that the windows in the build-
ing were blown out by the wind, that the gas furnace 
turned on, overheated and caused the fire. Or it could be 
argued that one of defendant's employees left a cigarette 
near some flammable material that was fanned into a fire 
by the wind. There is the further possibility that the elec-
tric power lines running into the building could have been 
broken by the wind, shorted and ·Caused the fire. There 
are numerous possibilities that are more probative of the 
cause of the fire than defendant's sign. 
Plaintiff might just as well have brought suit against 
one of his employees or Utah Power and Light Co. as point 
a finger of blame at this defendant. 
Plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the fire 
started in the sign. He completely failed to show that 
anything from the sign came in contact with the roof at 
any time or if it did, that it was charged with electricity. 
Plaintiff's evidence proved that his property was destroyed 
by a fire that occurred during the early morning of O·cto-
ber 30, 1959. An examination of the record shows ab-
solutely no evidence of the cause of the fire. 
The trial court properly ruled that the plaintiff failed 
to make out a case for the jury. 
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POINT II 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN 
THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO 
THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE. 
Plaintiff cannot use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
as a means of getting the question of causation to the jury. 
Until the plaintiff has shown by some competent evi-
dence what caused the fire, we do not reach the question 
of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur 
is linzitcd to the question of whether the defendant was 
negligent-it has nothing to do with the element of causa-
tion. 
In the case of Jackson v. Colston supra an action was 
brought to recover damages for the alleged burning of 
the lower leg of the plaintiff, ·claimed to have been in-
flicted while she was undergoing reducing treatments 
administered under the direction of the defendants. The 
trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict on the 
ground that there was nothing more than speculation as 
to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. On appeal, the 
plaintiff claimed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
should apply, which, with the medical testimony, was suf-
ficient to require the court to submit the case to the jury. 
This court affirmed the trial court holding that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur could not be used as a vehicle to 
get the case to the jury, in the absence of competent evi-
dence of the cause of the injuries. This court said: 
uHowever, a proper understanding of the na-
ture and scope of the doctrine (res ipsa loquitur) 
makes it unnecessary to determine whether the rule 
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should be applied in the case at bar. In any ac-
tion for personal injuries arising out of alleged 
negligent acts or omissions of the defendant, it is 
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove first, that 
the defendant was negligent and, second, that the 
defendants' negligent acts or omissions proximately 
caused the injury sustained by the plaintiff. In 
a proper case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may 
relieve the plaintiff of the duty of showing specific 
acts of negligence, but the authorities unanimously 
hold that the causal connection between the alleged 
negligent acts and the injury is never presumed and 
that this is a matter the plaintiff is always required 
to prove affirmatively. Res ipsa loquitur is limited 
to the question of whether the defendant was 
negligent-it has nothing to do with the element 
of causation. ::· ::· ::· the rule is stated as follows: 
* ::- ::· In every personal injury case the plaintiff 
must establish two propositions: First, that the de-
fendant was negligent; and second, the causal con-
nection between the negligence and the injury 
complained of. Negligence is sometimes presumed, 
as in cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
applies, or where there has been a violation of a 
statutory duty, but the proximate cause of an in-
jury is never presumed. On this question there is 
no conflict of authority." (Italics ours) 
In Farnzers Honze Mutual Insurance Company vs. 
Grand Forks l1nplement Conzpany 55 NW 2d 315 (North 
Dakota 1952) the Supreme Court of North Dakota held 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not available to 
establish proximate cause. In the Farmers case a fire be-
gan in defendant's machine shop and spread to and dam-
aged the place of business of the plain tiff's insured. At 
the time the fire was discovered, the defendant's em-
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ployees were cleaning a generator and a motor by using 
gasoline and a brush. There was some evidence that the 
fire may have been caused by a short circuit. The plain-
tiffs claimed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was avail-
able to show the actual motivating source of the fire. The 
court refused to apply the doctrine stating: 
((Plaintiffs are clearly in error in their theory 
that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is available to 
establish proximate .cause. In proper cases, where 
proximate cause is established, the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur comes into play to establish prima 
facie proof of negligence. The doctrine (has no ap-
plication to proximate cause and does not dispense 
with the requirement that the act or omission on 
which defendant's liability is predicated be estab-
lished as the proximate cause of the injury com-
plained of; ::· ::- ::.' ::- :z. :z. the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not raise any presumption as to what 
did occasion the injury, but, after the evidence has 
established the thing which did occasion the injury, 
then, under certain circumstances, this doctrine 
zuill raise a presu1nption of negligence." (Italics 
ours) 
In Kendall vs Fordhanz 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183 
(Utah 1932) the Supreme Court of Utah held the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to a case involving dam-
ages caused by a fire. Here an action was brought to re-
cover damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant 
in causing a fire which burned up a wheat field of about 
9 3 acres belonging to the plaintiffs. The defendants drove 
their car on plaintiffs wheat field and left it to go talk to 
one of the plaintiffs. After an hour or two when the de-
fendants returned to the car they discovered it was burn-
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ing. In attempting to put out the fire, a burning pad was 
thrown on the wheat field thereby causing the fire. The 
Court stated there was no evidence in the case to show 
what started the fire in defendant's automobile, and there-
fore the Court was in error in permitting the jury to 
speculate as to its origin. The Court said: 
((No claim is here made, nor can the claim be 
successfully maintained, that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has any application to the facts dis-
closed by the evidence in this case, nor can it be 
said that parking an automobile on or near dry 
June grass ad joining a wheat field is an act of 
negligence. There is likewise no evidence that the 
automobile was smouldering with fire when the de-
fendant and Mr. Carter left it to go over to where 
one of the plaintiffs was engaged in repairing his 
combine harvester. The court was in error in sub-
mitting these alleged acts of negligence to the 
. '' Jury. 
Dean Prosser in his work on Torts states that res ipsa 
loquitur cannot be invoked to permit the jury to speculate 
on causation. 
((It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove 
merely that he has been injured by the negligence 
of someone unidentified. Even though there is 
beyond all possible doubt negligence in the air, it 
is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant. 
On this too the plaintiff has the burden of proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence; and in any case 
where it is clear that it is at least equally probable 
that the negligence was that of another, the court 
must instruct the jury that the plaintiff has not 
proved his case. The injury must be traced to a 
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specific instrumentality or cause for which the de-
fendant was responsible, or it must be shown that 
he was responsible for all reasonably probable 
causes to 1vhich the accident could be attributed." 
(Italics ours) Prosser on Torts 2d. Ed. p. 204 
Plaintiff has cited the case of Wightman v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. supra as authority for the contention that 
there is a greater probability that the sign caused the fire 
than some other cause. In the Wightman case a gas ex-
plosion destroyed the plaintiff's house and killed Mr. 
Wightman. It should be noted that in the Wightman 
case the cause of the explosion was established. The gas 
had definitely caused the explosion-the issue was whether 
the explosion occurred in the area for which the gas com-
pany was responsible or in the area for which the Wight-
mans were responsible. The court said there must be a 
reasonable basis shown in the evidence from which a jury 
could conclude that the explosion occurred in the area for 
which the gas company was responsible. In the instant 
case there is no evidence as to the cause of the fire. This 
court refused to apply res ipsa loquitur and stated: 
uThis brings us to the issue, crucial to the 
plaintiff's case, whether her evidence was sufficient 
upon which to base a finding that the source of the 
explosion was in the area for which the gas com-
pany was responsible. Such proof cannot rest upon 
speculation or conjecture, nor upon a mere choice 
of probabilities. To give rise to a jury question 
there must be something in the evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably believe that there 
is a greater probability that the explosion occurred 
in that part of the installation than in the pipes or 
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appliances installed by and under the care of the 
Wightmans. Only if there is some such basis in 
the evidence would there be any foundation to per-
mit the jury, under res ipsa loquitur, to infer that 
some defect or lack of due care in the gas com-
pany's part of the installation caused the leak and 
the resulting explosion." (Italics ours) 
The court further stated: 
uN evertheless, a finding of liability of dam-
ages must rest on something substantial. We be-
lieve that the trial court correctly decided that 
there was no reasonable basis shown in the evidence 
which would justify a conclusion that there was 
any greater likelihood that the explosion occurred 
in the gas company's part of the installation than 
in the house piping or appliances for which the 
Wightmans were responsible. It thus did not err 
in refusing to submit the matter to the jury." 
Even when the cause of the injury is known this 
Court has been reluctant to apply the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. In the case of Matievitch v. Hercules Powder 
Company, 3 Utah 2d 283, 282 P. 2d 1045 the plaintiff was 
injured by a cap, and stick of dynamite of defendant's 
manufacture that exploded as he placed them in a drill 
hole. This court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
not applicable when there was no evidence as to how or 
why the dynamite exploded, no evidence as to when or 
how it was manufactured and none as to how or by whom 
it had been handled or treated prior to use. There was 
evidence that the plaintiff handled the dynamite in a man-
ner other than as recommended by instructions which ac-
companied the containers in which they were packaged. 
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The court rejected plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loqui-
tur and made the following statement: 
((Plaintiff urges that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is applicable under the circumstances re-
cited. We cannot agree. To do so would be to 
impose absolute liability and insurability upon 
manufacturers of explosives and perhaps most any 
other commodity. To do so would be to extend 
the fact or fiction of control necessary to invoke 
the doctrine to an unreasonable, impractical and 
unrealistic degree, where mere injury could dis-
pense with plaintiff's burden of proving a defend-
ant's 11cgligence, even where it would be impos-
sible for defendant to show freedom therefrom." 
(Italics ours) 
Plaintiff is attempting to use the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur as a crutch to get the matter of causation to a 
jury. The courts and text writers have uniformly held 
that causation must be based on some competent evidence 
and cannot rest on speculation. A gas furnace, a stove, 
smoking material, all present in a building heavily stocked 
with flammable materials, coupled with a violent wind-
storm which very likely blew out the windows-these fac-
tors linked together demonstrate the speculative elements 
surrounding this fire. 
Plaintiff's failure to produce any testimony that 
would support a verdict that the sign caused the fire pre-
cluded the submission of the case to the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
The building occupied by the plaintiff was destroyed 
by a fire which occurred in the early morning during a 
violent windstorm. There is no evidence as to the cause of 
the fire. There was· no evidence whatsoever that defend-
ant's sign caused the fire. As this court stated in the Wight-
man case supra. 
uN evertheless a finding of liability for dam-
ages must rest on something substantial. 
* 
Such proof cannot rest upon speculation or 
conjecture nor upon a mere choice of probabilities." 
The undisputed facts in this case show that there is 
no reasonable basis on which a jury could find that de-
fendant caused the :fire or that defendant was negligent. 
The order granting the motion for a directed verdict 
was proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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